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Abstract—We investigate the impact of decisions made by a
CDN willing to maximize its revenue through the management
of cache servers. Based on a model with two network providers,
we highlight that revenue-oriented management policies can
affect the user-perceived quality of experience, impacting the
competition among network access providers in favor of the
largest one. Since this contradicts the principle underpinning
network neutrality–although not with the technical net neutrality
rules–we discuss the necessity to regulate CDN activity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Content Delivery Network (CDN) providers have become
key actors in the value chain of Internet delivery: both network
operators and content providers benefit from CDNs to improve
the satisfaction of their customers. Indeed, the presence of
CDN edge servers, which store content and serve end-users at
the edges of the network, is expected to improve the Quality
of Experience (QoE), and consequently the engagement, of the
end-users [6]. An abundant literature is related to the perfor-
mances of CDNs; a less-studied implication of the presence
of CDN edge servers deep in the network of Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) is that ISPs and content providers can leverage
the CDN to differentiate their services from their competitors.
The CDN providers being revenue-driven actors, it is indeed
possible to pay to get a better service or to degrade the Quality
of Service (QoS) of competitors. In [8], we showed that a
dominant Content Provider (CP) can pay to harm a smaller
competitor. In the current paper, we focus on the impact that
CDNs have on the competition between network operators.
We study the CDN behavior from an economic standpoint.
We first describe a topology that we will use throughout the
paper, with two ISPs and a CDN which can place its servers
close to users in the ISPs’ networks or at an intermediate
level before reaching the ISPs. We analyze the best (revenue-
maximizing) caching strategies and show that depending on
popularities, the quality perceived by users of an ISP can be
affected by those caching strategies. Then based on VoD traces,
we illustrate the practical relevance of the analysis and show
that an economic differentiation can (again) be at the expense
of some users through degraded QoE, affecting the competition
among ISPs. Finally we highlight the need to include CDNs
in the network neutrality debate.
This work has been partially funded by Orange, however the ideas developed
here solely reflect the authors’ vision.
II. MODEL
We consider a CDN, which delivers content on behalf of a
set of CPs to a population of end-users spread into k distinct
networks (owned by distinct ISPs). For the sake of simplicity,
we consider k = 2 in the following (and index ISPs with A
and B). The model can be extended to more ISPs.
The CDN includes one intermediate server (noted as I),
which is shared by both network operators, and optionally
an edge server in each ISP (noted as A and B, for ISPA
and ISPB respectively). Various forms of agreement between
CDNs and ISPs exist in reality for the management of an edge
server. For example the CDN sometimes pays a fee to the
ISP for the rental of a rack in an ISP’s colocation center [3].
Another typical agreement is based on resource exchanges in
a federation of ISP-CDNs [10]. We consider here a situation
close to the latter example where the CDN pays the ISP for
the rental of storage resources in privileged network locations.
When an end-user, regardless of the network she belongs
to, requests some content, she can be served either by the edge
server of her ISP (if any), or by the shared intermediate server,
or, if none of them store the content, by the origin server. In the
latter case, the CDN cache miss results in a drop of the QoE.
Note that an end-user from a given ISP cannot be served by
the edge server of another ISP. See Figure 1 for an illustration.
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Fig. 1. CDN Topology with two ISPs, an intermediate server, and two edge
servers A and B.
A. Terminology and Notations
We use the same model as in [8]. Details are below.
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Content popularities. Each piece of content has two pop-
ularity values, xA and xB , where xj represents the expected
number of downloads from population j ∈ {A,B} per time
unit for that specific content.
Service prices. The CDN charges the CPs at higher rates
when content is accessed from a CDN server closer to users.
We consider fixed prices per unit of content (and per down-
load), and without loss of generality we assume that the service
is free for content accessed from the origin server. This leaves
three prices pA, pB , and pI , which are assumed given since
we focus on the cache management.
Transit costs. We denote by qI the transit cost per content
unit from the origin server to the intermediate server, and by
qj the transit cost per content unit from the origin server to
the edge server j (j = A,B). Those transit costs are borne
by the CDN, hence an incentive to cache popular content to
avoid undergoing those costs for each download.
Revenue per download. Based on the service price and
the transit cost, we denote by rj , (j = I, A,B) the extra
revenue for the CDN per content served from cache j, as a
comparison to a CDN cache miss (service from the origin
server). In addition to the received payment pj , the CDN also
saves qj in transit costs, hence rj = pj + qj .
Storage costs or limits. We consider three alternatives to
set the capacities of CDN servers. In each case, we define
three non-negative values λI , λA, λB to represent the marginal
prices (per time unit) for storage: those values appear when
maximizing the CDN revenue under the capacity constraints.
To model the capacities and set the storage cost parameters,
we encompass several cases, including:
• Fixed, given, capacities for each server, as in [8]. The three
parameters are then Lagrangian multipliers (shadow price) for
each capacity constraint.
• Capacities agreed with a (convex) cost function for each
server. The three parameters are the marginal capacity costs at
each CDN location.
• Capacities agreed with a linear function (a particular case
of the one above). The parameters are unit capacity prices at
each CDN location.
B. Where to Store the Content (if at all)?
As in [8], the objective of the CDN provider is to choose
caching strategies maximizing its revenue per time unit. Math-
ematically, let us denote by
• Si(Ci) the cost of storage capacity Ci (i = A,B, I):
if capacity is fixed beforehand to C˜i then we have
Si(x) =
{
0 if x ≤ C˜i
+∞ otherwise;
• M a measure representing the distribution of populari-
ties, more precisely for a Lebesgue-measurable subset
S of R2+, M(S) is the total volume of content whose
popularities belong to S.
Then, for each piece of content with popularities (xA, xB), the
CDN (assumed to know those values) selects cache location(s)
L(xA, xB) ⊂ {I, A,B} to store it. Also including capacities
in the decisions, the revenue maximization problem consists in
finding capacities CA, CB , CI and a correspondence L maxi-
mizing gains under the capacity constraints, i.e., in solving
max
L,CA,CB ,CI
∫
xA,xB
xArA1l{A∈L(xA,xB)} + xBrB1l{B∈L(xA,xB)}
+ xArI1l{(I∈L(xA,xB))∩(A/∈L(xA,xB))}
+ xBrI1l{(I∈L(xA,xB))∩(B/∈L(xA,xB))}
− (xAqA + xBqB) dM(xA, xB)
− SA(CA)− SB(CB)− SI(CI)
s.t.
∫
xA,xB
1l{i∈L(xA,xB)}dM(xA, xB) ≤ Ci i ∈ {A,B, I}.
The three constraints in the optimization problem reflect
storage capacity limits, and the components in the objective
respectively express the gains from serving content from its
servers (A, B, I), the transit costs, and the capacity costs.
Note that gains and costs are weighted by popularities (since
they occur for each request) while capacity constraints only
involve volumes.
To solve that optimization problem, one can form the La-
grangian, denoting by λA, λB , and λI the respective multipli-
ers for the constraints. We study the local optimality conditions
for L, reasoning on the marginal revenue changes resulting
from changes in L around popularity values (xA, xB). There
are eight different possibilities for the CDN to handle that
piece of content, but the option of storing the content in I , A,
and B is never optimal (the content would never be retrieved
from I). The remaining seven options are listed in the first
column of Table I, where we give the marginal differences in
the Lagrangian of the optimization problem that stem from a
different handling of that specific content, taking as a reference
the decision of not caching anywhere in the CDN.
Where to store Marginal objective variation
nowhere 0
in I only (xA + xB)rI − λI
in A only xArA − λA
in B only xBrB − λB
in I and A xArA + xBrI − λI − λA
in I and B xArI + xBrB − λI − λB
in A and B xArA + xBrB − λA − λB
TABLE I. MARGINAL DIFFERENCES IN THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
(LAGRANGIAN) DEPENDING ON THE DECISIONS FOR A PIECE OF CONTENT
WITH POPULARITY x = (xA, xB). (Reference case: the content is not
stored close to end-users.)
Note that in Table I we treat λI , λA and λB as fixed:
this is true for the linear-cost model for capacity, while for
the other models those multipliers are determined by the
caching decisions and the capacity constraints. Nevertheless,
the reasoning above remains valid since we only consider
marginal (infinitesimal) variations.
When λI , λA, λB are known, Table I immediately provides
us with the optimal decision for the CDN manager: for each
piece of content, pick the option with the largest objective
variation. For example, the two first lines in the table indicate
that it is preferable to cache some content in I rather than not
cache it at all if (xA + xB)rI − λI > 0, or equivalently if
xA + xB >
λI
rI
: indeed, the extra unit revenue for allocating
some storage to that content would be (xA + xB)rI (from
payments and economies in transit traffic for each download,
hence dependent on popularities) while the unit perceived cost
for that space would be λI . Figure 2 shows the best decision
for any content with popularity (xA, xB), when λI = 2, λA =
4, λB = 5, rI = 2, rA = 2.5, rB = 3.
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Fig. 2. Optimal caching for three caches
III. AN ASYMMETRIC SCENARIO
We consider now an “asymmetric” scenario where the
CDN agrees with only one ISP, say ISPA, on the rental of
storage resources for an edge server A. Since the CDN has no
agreement with ISPB , the customers of ISPB have only one
option to get content from a nearby server (the server I) while
the customers of ISPA have two options (the server I and the
server A).The goal of ISPA is to both improve the QoE for its
customers and to generate some revenue from the exploitation
of a privileged location in the network.
The CDN has four ways to store a given content: in none of
the edge servers (i.e., in the origin server), in I only, in A only,
or in both I and A. A rational CDN again decides with regard
to economic objectives, so both servers I and A are filled so
that the net revenue is maximum. Figure 3 summarizes the one-
to-one comparisons of Table I, and illustrates the best caching
decisions as a function of the content popularity (xA, xB), for
given values of λI and λA.
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Fig. 3. Optimal caching decisions when there is no cache in B (λI =
1.5, λA = 2, rI = 1, rA = 2).
The figure highlights the impact that the edge server A
can have on the QoE of customers of ISPB . Consider some
content with a given popularity xB , and assume that xB ∈(
λI
rI
− λArA , λIrI
)
. Then the quality perceived by population B
for that content depends on the content popularity among
population A:
• if xA < λIrI − xB , the content is not cached at all and users
in population B get basic quality;
• if xA ∈ [λIrI −xB , x˜A) with x˜A = λArI +(xB − λIrI )( rArI − 1),
the content is stored in the intermediate cache I , therefore
users in both populations get better (say, medium) quality;
• if xA > x˜A, the content is kept in cache A, hence users in
population A get top quality while those in population B only
get basic quality.
Similarly, the quality perceived by population A for some
content depends on the popularity of that content in population
from ISPB . In particular, some content that is popular in ISPB
can be cached in I instead of A, which can thus slightly
degrade the QoE of users in ISPA.
A. Capacity of CDN Servers
The amount of data managed in each possible way (not
stored, stored in I and/or A) corresponds to the mass of content
in each zone as displayed in Figure 3, computed using the
joint distribution of (xA, xB). This amount is a function of
the service and storage prices (rj , j = I, A), and the values
of the unit (or shadow) prices (λj , j = I, A). Since prices are
fixed, let us denote the amount of stored content in I and A
by CI(λI , λA) and CA(λI , λA), respectively.
(i) In the case of linear capacity costs (i.e., fixed λA and λI ),
we immediately derive the storage capacity;
(ii) In the fixed-capacity case, λA and λI are solutions of{
CI(λI , λA) = C˜I
CA(λI , λA) = C˜A,
with C˜I and C˜A the fixed capacities of I and A, respectively;
(iii) Finally in the case of non-linear (convex) capacity costs,
λA and λI are solutions of the first-order optimality conditions
stating that the marginal revenue from capacity in I (resp.,
A) equals the marginal cost C′I(CI(λI , λA)) respectively,C′A(CI(λI , λA)) of that capacity, where CI and CA are the
capacity cost functions.
B. Analysis with VoD Traces
We have previously shown that the presence of edge servers
in the network of a given ISP can impact other ISPs. In the
following we quantify this impact on a concrete example.
Let us consider an initial configuration where the CDN has
only one intermediate server. Then, ISPA decides to rent an
edge server to the CDN in its network. The presence of the
edge server A becomes a source of conflicts, when content
previously stored in I gets now only stored in A (and no longer
in I). The QoE of end-users from ISPB is degraded because
the content is now accessed from the origin server.
We study the problem by confronting our model to some
real traces from a French Video on Demand (VoD) service. All
the requests for movies have been recorded during two years
from 2010 to 2012. A key point of this dataset is that it includes
the network origin of the requesters, which is here the Point
of Presence from which each request is emitted. There are
twelve “sub-networks” in the dataset, corresponding to twelve
different populations.
We use the dataset to build a realistic environment as fol-
lows. We associate the sub-network population that generated
the highest number of requests with ISPA (the network with an
edge server in our model). ISPA is thus the dominant network
in the system. The ISPB is the average of the other sub-
networks in the dataset. That is, for each movie, the popularity
xB is the average popularity over the eleven sub-networks.
Finally, we build a standard CDN with one intermediate server
for the whole country, and an edge server close to the end-users
in the regional sub-network ISPA.
Figure 4 depicts the joint popularity distribution of movies
using the same representation as in Figure 3. As can be
seen, the density of movies that are candidate for storage in
CDN (popular-enough movies) is mainly on south east, which
corresponds to storing content in A only.
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Fig. 4. Correlation between popularities from ISPA and ISPB . The gray
scale represents the number of movies that have a given popularity (xA, xB).
The results for this dataset are summarized in Figure 5,
where we show the impact of edge server A on the QoE of
ISPB users with respect to the initial configuration without
A. The QoE for content accessed from the origin server is
half the QoE from intermediate and edge servers. Our model
for capacity is the fixed-cost one: λI and λA are unit prices
for storage, and the CDN chooses the capacities such that
the marginal revenues equal those prices. On the y-axis , we
compute the ratio between the satisfaction with and without the
edge server A. On the x-axis, we set different storage costs
for A, from an aggressive policy (cheaper storage than in I)
to a benefit-oriented one (A more expensive than I).
As Figure 5 illustrates, the edge server A has both a
positive impact on ISPA user satisfaction (which is expected),
and a negative impact on ISPB user satisfaction (which is not
suitable). Observe that the negative impact on ISPB exceeds
the positive impact on ISPA for most of the storage cost
prices on A. Hence a powerful network operator does not
need to implement any aggressive pricing policy to degrade
the performances of competitors: an efficient strategy can be
to set a high rental price for the storage in A to both get
revenues from the CDN and acquire customers due to churn
from ISPB .
0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5
0.8
1
1.2
storage cost pricing: λAλI
im
pa
ct
on
us
er
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n ISPA ISPB
positive impact
negative impact
aggressive pricing benefit-oriented pricing
Fig. 5. Impact of the cache within ISPA on user perceived quality in both
ISPs.
IV. SHOULD THE CDNS BE REGULATED?
In February 2015, the US regulator reinforced the principle
of net neutrality, classifying broadband Internet service as
a public utility. A key rule of net neutrality is the non-
differentiation of packets in the network, regardless of the
application. A reasoning behind it is to ensure that new
entrants can enter the market without massively investing in the
infrastructure. This rule mainly targets CPs, and also applies
to ISPs. A “neutral” network should allow a new ISP to start
providing access service and to benefit from the services of a
CDN despite a smaller population than its competitors.
In this paper, we have shown that edge servers located deep
in the network can violate this principle because the CDN
favors incumbent ISPs and prevent smaller network operators
from benefiting from a good quality of service. On the other
hand, one can argue that, in our scenario, the ISPA is rewarded
from investing in its infrastructure (here installing an edge
server in its network). In our opinion, the positive impact on the
satisfaction of customers of ISPA is legitimate but the negative
impact on ISPB is not.
We call for a scientific debate on the definition and reg-
ulation of a neutral CDN. In the context of the competition
among content providers, we sketched some proposals in [9],
in the vein of other past papers related to net neutrality [1],
[4] and CDN management [2], [5].
This paper is also another approach for studying networks
of caches. In the recent years, the scientific community has
paid a lot of attention on Content Centric Network (CCN) pro-
posals, which are based on in-network caching and decoupling
between content and destination host. Many papers have dealt
with the management of in-network caches [7], [11] but to our
knowledge the economic aspects behind network management
have been ignored so far.
Our future works include the merge of both models from
the present paper and the one in [8], i.e., to consider content
popularities distributions differing among ISPs and CPs. Our
motivation is to understand all (sometimes conflicting) interests
that a CDN provider has to take into account when managing
its CDN, to identify the scenarios that may require the attention
of regulators regarding neutrality, and to provide solutions
that preserve not only the profits of CDNs but also a fair
competition among all other involved actors.
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